The use of open, Internet-based communications for business-to-business (B2B) interactions requires accountability for and acknowledgment of the actions of participants. Accountability and acknowledgment can be achieved by the systematic maintenance of an irrefutable audit trail to render the interaction non-repudiable. To safeguard the interests of each party, the mechanisms used to meet this requirement should ensure fairness. That is, misbehavior should not disadvantage well-behaved parties. Despite the fact that Web services are increasingly used to enable B2B interactions, there is currently no systematic support to deliver such guarantees. This paper introduces a flexible framework to support fair non-repudiable B2B interactions based on a trusted delivery agent. A Web services implementation is presented. The role of the delivery agent can be adapted to different end user capabilities and to meet different application requirements.
Introduction
The increasing use of open, internet-based communications for business-to-business (B2B) interactions adds urgency to the requirements for security and regulation to safeguard the interests of participants. These requirements include: accountability for and acknowledgement of the actions of participants; and the monitoring of interactions for compliance with business contract. Accountability and acknowledgement can be achieved by the systematic maintenance of an irrefutable audit trail to render B2B interactions non-repudiable. Regulation entails the monitoring of interactions to ensure that messages exchanged are consistent with the business contracts that govern the interaction.
The above requirements are particularly important in high-value B2B relationships, such as in a virtual organization (VO). In a VO, a number of autonomous organizations collaborate to achieve some mutually beneficial goal. Each organization requires that their interests are protected in the context of the VO. Specifically, that partner organizations comply with contracts governing the VO; that their own legitimate actions (such as delivery of work, commission of service) are recognized; and that partner organizations are accountable for their actions. This implies the recording of activity for audit and the monitoring of activity for compliance with the regulatory regime. Further, to protect the interests of well-behaved members of a VO, the interaction should be non-repudiable (no party should be able to deny their participation) and the auditing and monitoring functions must be fair (misbehavior should not disadvantage well-behaved parties).
It is increasingly common to standardize B2B interactions in terms of messageexchange patterns. The work of the RosettaNet Consortium is a case in point. 1 RosettaNet define the externally observable aspects of a B2B interaction through a set of Partner Interface Processes (PIPs). PIPs standardize the XML-based business messages that should be exchanged between partners to execute some function (such as order processing). Figure 1 shows the delivery of a business message and associated acknowledgements in such an interaction. Typically, for each business message, there should be an immediate acknowledgement of receipt -indicating successful delivery of the message. Eventually, a second acknowledgement indicates whether the business message is valid (or invalid) in the context of the given interaction. Finally, the validation message is acknowledged in return.
Validation of the original business message (performed at B ) can be arbitrarily complex. For example, it may simply involve verification that a message is syntactically valid and in correct sequence with respect to a single PIP. Alternatively, a message may require validation with respect to more complex contractual conditions or with respect to local application state. Triggering validation at the level of business message delivery has the potential to allow specialization of an application to meet the constraints of different regulatory regimes. A PIP, or composition of PIPs, may specify the general form of a B2B process that is then validated at run-time in the context of a specific business relationship. Web services are increasingly used to enable B2B interactions of this kind. However, there is currently no systematic support to make the exchange of the business message and associated acknowledgements both fair and non-repudiable. For example, there is no systematic support to prevent a customer from denying that they submitted a purchase order and at the same time to prevent the supplier from denying its receipt.
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a flexible framework for fair, non-repudiable message delivery and its implementation using Web services technologies. The implementation comprises a set of services that are invoked at the middleware level and, therefore, enable the Web services developer to concentrate on business functions. Our middleware renders the exchange of business messages fair and non-repudiable. Arbitrarily complex, application-level validation is supported through the registration of message validators to validate messages upon receipt. The paper describes two fair exchange protocols that have been chosen for initial implementation. However, our framework is sufficiently flexible to adapt to different application requirements and, in particular, to execute different protocols.
This paper represents a significant extension to the work presented in Ref.
2. The description of the implementation has been extended. In particular, we explain the use of protocol-specific handlers to adapt the middleware to execute different protocols (see Sec. 4). This is followed by a new section that presents a demonstrator application. Section 2 provides an overview of the underlying concepts of nonrepudiation and fairness, and of our approach to achieving these properties for an interaction of the type described above. Section 3 provides a detailed discussion of the initial fair exchange protocols chosen. Their implementation is based on a trusted third party (TTP) delivery agent. The agent can either take on most of the responsibilities of evidence verification and storage and, thereby, simplify the tasks for its users; or greater responsibility can be transferred to the users to reduce the demands on the delivery agent. Section 4 describes the implementation based on Web service technologies. Section 5 presents a simple tender processing application that demonstrates the use of the middleware to validate an offer with respect to contract and to make the process both fair and non-repudiable. Section 6 discusses related work. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Basic Concepts and Approach
In this section, we introduce some basic concepts that will be used throughout the paper. We then provide an overview of the approach taken to render the interaction described in Sec. 1, both fair and non-repudiable.
Basic concepts
Non-repudiation is the inability to subsequently deny an action or event. It is one of the key properties of secure systems as defined in Ref. 3 . In the context of distributed systems, non-repudiation is applied to the sending and receiving of messages. For example, for the delivery of a message from A to B : (i) B may require non-repudiation of origin of the message (NRO) -irrefutable evidence that the message originated at A; and (ii) A may require non-repudiation of receipt of the message (NRR) -irrefutable evidence that B received the message.
Non-repudiation is usually achieved using public key cryptography. If A signs a message with their private key, B can confirm the origin of the message by verifying the signature using A's public key. Similarly, given B 's signature on the message, A can confirm receipt by verifying the signature using B 's public key.
Exchanging non-repudiation evidence is essential to be able to subsequently demonstrate what happened during an interaction. An additional requirement is that at the end of the interaction no well-behaved party has been disadvantaged. For example, consider the situation where the sender provides proof of origin but does not obtain the corresponding proof of receipt. This is unfair because the receiver can choose to deny receipt of a message. Fairness can be achieved by executing a fair exchange protocol. Markowitch et al. 4 provide the following definition of fairness: ". . . The communication channel's quality being fixed, at the end of the protocol run, either all involved parties obtain their expected items or none (even a part) of the information to be exchanged with respect to the missing items is received".
Most practical approaches to the delivery of the fairness guarantee require some support from a TTP. The level of TTP intervention can vary depending on the protocol and the requirements of the end users. Kremer et al. 5 identify three main types of TTP: inline, online and offline. An inline TTP (sometimes called a delivery agent) is involved in transmission of each protocol message. An online TTP is involved in each session of a protocol but not in every message transmission. An offline TTP is involved in a protocol when a dishonest entity behaves incorrectly or in case of network failures.
Overview of approach
To illustrate our approach, we take the business interaction described in Sec. 1 and make it fair and non-repudiable. Figure 2 (a) introduces a delivery agent (DA), or inline TTP, to the interaction shown in Fig. 1 . Four types of evidence are generated: (i) non-repudiation of origin (NRO) that msg originated at A; (ii) non-repudiation of submission (NRS) to the DA of msg and its NRO; (iii) non-repudiation of receipt (NRR) of msg by B ; (iv) non-repudiation of validation (NRV) -valid or otherwise, as determined by validation of msg by B. As shown, A starts an exchange by sending a message, with proof of origin, to DA. This is the equivalent of message 1 in Fig. 1 with the NRO appended. DA provides NRS in return to indicate their willingness to proceed with the exchange. Then DA exchanges msg and NRO for NRR with B (before application-level validation of msg). DA provides NRR to A -equivalent to message 2 in Fig. 1 . Subsequently, B performs application-level validation of msg and provides NRV to DA. The DA, in turn, provides NRV to A (message 3 of Fig. 1 ) and provides acknowledgement of NRV to B (message 4 of Fig. 1) . Note, the exact sequence of the exchange will be dictated by the actual protocol used and should not be inferred from Fig. 2(a) .
As shown in Fig. 2 (b), our approach is to deploy interceptors that act on behalf of the end users in an interaction. An interceptor has two main functions: (i) to protect the interests of the party on whose behalf it acts by executing appropriate protocols and accessing appropriate services, including TTP services; and (ii) to abstract away the detail of the mechanisms used to render an interaction safe and reliable for its end user. In this case, the mechanism used is to execute a nonrepudiation protocol with an inline DA. It is the responsibility of the DA to ensure fairness and liveness for well-behaved parties in interactions that the DA supports. Further, the DA' s fairness and liveness guarantees hold for well-behaved parties in spite of any misbehavior by any other party involved in an interaction. Since the cooperation of misbehaving parties cannot be guaranteed, in extremis the DA will ensure that any disputes that arise can be resolved in favor of well-behaved parties.
For an interaction of the type described in Sec. 1, the introduction of interceptors means that the end users, A and B, experience the message exchange shown in Fig. 1 . However, the exchange that actually takes place is as shown in Fig. 2(a) . That is, as far as possible, A and B are free to concentrate on application level concerns while their interaction is rendered fair and non-repudiable.
From DA's point of view there is no distinction between A and A's interceptor, or B and B 's interceptor (similarly, for A with respect to B and B with respect to A). Therefore, we only distinguish between an end user and their interceptor when necessary -for example, when discussing the implementation.
Delivery Agent-Based Fair Exchange
This section discusses the first two fair exchange protocols we have chosen to implement. First, we provide an overview of the chosen protocols and discuss the motivation behind the choice. Then we state protocol assumptions and notation. The section concludes with a detailed description of each protocol. In addition to a main protocol, there are sub-protocols to support exception handling. Since the delivery agent is trusted, these sub-protocols can be used for timely, and fair, termination of an exchange despite non-cooperation of one of the other participants in the main protocol.
Protocol overview
Coffey and Saidha developed a fair non-repudiation protocol that uses an inline TTP.
6 This was later improved by Zhou and Gollman. 7 The protocols presented here are derived from the improved protocol. Both protocols include our modifications: (i) to provide A with proof of submission to DA; (ii) to support the nonrepudiation of validation described in Sec. 2 (adding 3 protocol steps); and (iii) to support exception handling through the execution of sub-protocols. The first protocol is a further modification to support light-weight end users. The second protocol uses a light-weight DA and is closer to the original Coffey and Saidha protocol.
In the first protocol, the DA is responsible for much of the evidence verification and for the long-term storage of evidence for audit. The end users only need to verify evidence produced by the DA and, in consequence, only need access to the information necessary to verify a known third party's signature and credentials. This means that the end users may only require credential management at the level used by the typical Web browser (as opposed to access to the more comprehensive public key infrastructure (PKI) required to verify evidence from all parties with whom they may interact). End user logging requirements are also reduced. Minimally, they only need to maintain the information necessary to link an interaction to the evidence held by the DA (such as a protocol run identifier).
In the second protocol, the responsibilities for evidence verification and longterm storage are transferred to the end users, reducing the DA responsibilities. In this case, the DA may discard information after termination of an exchange and need only sign the non-repudiation of submission evidence (as opposed to all nonrepudiation tokens seen by the other participants). A lighter-weight DA inevitably leads to increased direct end-user reliance on supporting PKI and to increased end-user responsibility for long-term storage of evidence.
We have chosen to implement the preceding two protocols because they are consistent with a service-oriented approach to the provision of fair non-repudiation. The protocols also demonstrate the flexibility of our approach by allowing end users to determine the degree of outsourcing of non-repudiation services to the DA. The middleware framework described in Sec. 4 is not restricted to the execution of the two initial protocols. We intend to exploit this flexibility by implementing other protocols; including optimistic protocols that only involve a TTP for exception handling (see Ref. 8 , for an example). As discussed in Sec. 7, we plan to develop tools that automate as much of the protocol implementation process as possible.
Assumptions
We make the standard perfect cryptography assumptions, 9 including: (i) that message digests (secure hashes) are one-way, collision resistant; (ii) that it is computationally infeasible to predict the next bit of a secure pseudo-random sequence even with complete knowledge of the algorithmic or hardware generator and of all of the previous bits in the sequence; (iii) that digital signatures cannot be forged; and (iv) that encrypted data cannot be decrypted except with the appropriate decryption key.
Non-repudiation relies on maintaining the integrity of signed evidence beyond the execution of the given exchange. If the key used to sign evidence can be revoked without reference to the parties that rely on the evidence, then the integrity of the signature can be undermined. A signing party can use their private key to generate a signature and a relying party can verify the signature upon receipt. However, the signing party can subsequently revoke the key. Without evidence of the time of use of the key, a relying party cannot prove that the signature was generated before key revocation and the signing party can repudiate the evidence. For this reason, if a signing key is revocable (as is the case for commonly used schemes such as the X509 PKI 10 ), a trusted time-stamp must be applied to signed evidence to demonstrate that the key was not compromised at the time of use. Given A's signature s on some data x (s = sig A (x)), a TTP time-stamping authority, TSA, can generate the time-stamp: {T g , sig T SA (s, T g )} as proof of the generation (or existence) of s at time T g .
7 Assuming A' s key was not revoked at time T g , the trusted time-stamp prevents A from subsequently denying the validity of s. Note that the validity of such time-stamps is not dependent on clock synchronization. A time-stamp is valid if generated and signed by a trusted authority. For protocols that use an inline TTP, time-stamps can be applied by that TTP. For brevity, time-stamping is not shown in the protocol descriptions that follow.
A protocol specifies the correct behavior of its participants. Well-behaved parties adhere to the protocol specification. We make the following assumptions about communications between well-behaved parties and their cooperation in protocol execution.
(1) The communication channel between well-behaved parties provides eventual message delivery. This requires that there is a bounded number of temporary network and computer related failures between well-behaved parties. (2) Each party has persistent storage for messages. More precisely, well-behaved parties will ensure that messages are available for as long as is necessary to meet their obligations to other parties. Longer term storage may be required for their own purposes. (3) Well-behaved parties only exchange messages that are well-constructed with respect to the protocol being executed. For example: messages exchanged are either tamper-resistant (encrypted), or tampering is detectable and secure hash of x id unique protocol run identifier i, j concatenation of items i and j P → Q : m P sends m to Q sig P (x) P 's digital signature on x enc P (x) encryption of x with P 's public key VAL | INV signifies msg validity or invalidity NVAL signifies msg not validated Table 2 . Definition of non-repudiation tokens.
Non-repudiation Token Description
DA's substitute NRV of msg well-behaved parties will cooperate to ensure a well-constructed message is eventually delivered.
To guarantee fairness, we make the same assumptions with respect to the DA as in existing fair exchange protocols, namely: (i) that the DA is well-behaved; (ii) that, given the perfect cryptography assumptions, the DA can detect the misbehavior of other parties; and (iii) that the DA will ensure protocol resolution in favor of well-behaved parties.
Notation
In the protocols, participant A wishes to send a business message, msg, to participant B. All communications between A and B take place through delivery agent DA. Table 1 provides the notation used for basic protocol elements. To simplify protocol descriptions, and without loss of generality, it is assumed that the signature scheme is recoverable. That is, if necessary, x (and any items that are concatenated to construct x) may be recovered from sig P (x). a To allow verification of rn as a protocol authenticator, it is also assumed that id contains h(rn). Table 2 defines the non-repudiation evidence exchanged during a protocol run. DA associates a termination state with each exchange. The state is SUCCEEDED if the exchange is successfully completed and ABORTED if the exchange is canceled.
Fair exchange for light-weight end users
This section first discusses normal execution to successful completion of the main protocol for light-weight end users. We then present abort and resolve sub-protocols for exception handling.
Normal protocol execution
Normal execution of the main protocol is shown below, followed by a commentary on each step.
Step 1: A sends a business message (msg), a secure pseudo-random number (rn) and its non-repudiation of origin token (NRO A ) to DA. At this step, if DA finds that the id included in NRO A is not unique, an appropriate response will be generated to prompt A to restart the protocol with a newly generated id. Otherwise, the protocol will proceed to step 2. The rn provided by A is used in step 8 as the acknowledgement of receipt of B 's NRV token. All items are encrypted to guarantee that B does not obtain the items before providing nonrepudiation of receipt.
Step 2: DA provides proof of submission to A to signal willingness to proceed with the exchange. This step may be executed in parallel with step 3.
Step 3: To enable B to construct NRR B : DA sends the id, the participant identifiers A and B (recovered from NRO A ) and a hash of msg to B.
Step 4: B responds with NRR B . It is safe for B to send the receipt to DA before obtaining msg because DA, as TTP, can and will provide msg in return. NRR B is encrypted to guarantee that A can only obtain the receipt if the exchange runs to some form of successful completion.
Step 5: DA sends NRR DA to A. This is DA's receipt for msg and assurance that it has received and verified NRR B . This step may be executed in parallel with step 6.
Step 6: DA sends msg and associated NRO DA to B.
Step 7: B performs application-level validation of msg. The outcome of this validation is signed along with id to form NRV B that is sent to DA.
Step 8: rn, hitherto known only to A and DA, is sent to B as acknowledgement of receipt for NRV B . This step may be executed in parallel with step 9.
Step 9: DA sends NRV DA to A -non-repudiation of the outcome of validation of msg.
At the end of execution of the main protocol, A has acquired the following evidence: NRS DA , NRR DA and NRV DA -non-repudiation of submission, receipt and validation of msg. In return, B has acquired: msg, NRO DA and rn -the business message with non-repudiation of origin and acknowledgement of validation of msg. DA has the complete set of evidence, including: NRO A , NRR B and NRV B . Fairness is guaranteed because DA controls the release of the evidence to A and B. Furthermore, DA's signature on the evidence provided to A and B : (i) serves as a guarantee that DA has seen, verified and will store the evidence for future reference; and (ii) reduces the verification work of A and B to that of verifying the signature and associated credentials of a well-known TTP.
If B does not wish to perform application-level validation of msg, then the protocol can terminate at step 6. In this case, at step 4, B sends DA both NRR B and a default NRV B token that confirms the validity of msg. At step 5, DA sends A both NRR DA and NRV DA . At step 6, DA sends rn to B with msg and NRO DA .
On successful completion of the main protocol, DA sets termination state to SUCCEEDED .
Exception handling
In exceptional circumstances, A or B may request that DA terminate the main protocol before completion. Such requests typically occur because A or B is concerned about the liveness of protocol execution (whether as a result of the non-cooperation of a participant or extraneous factors such as network delays). There are two types of request: abort: where the requesting party wishes to terminate the protocol as if no exchange had taken place. That is, neither A nor B receive any useful information about the exchange. resolve: where the requesting party seeks DA's assistance to secure normal termination. That is, all expected items (or their equivalent) are available to wellbehaved parties.
These requests are, in effect, the statement of a preference for how the exchange should complete. Irrespective of the type of request, it is the responsibility of DA to ensure that fairness guarantees hold for all honest parties. Depending on the progress of the main protocol and whether the exchange termination state has already been set, DA must determine whether the exchange should terminate in ABORTED state (no exchange has taken place) or SUCCEEDED state (exchange has taken place). An exchange can terminate in SUCCEEDED state if and only if: (i) A is entitled to NRS DA , NRR DA and NRV DA (or an equivalent substitution); and (ii) B is entitled to msg, rn and NRO DA .
DA is empowered to issue the substitute non-repudiation of validation, NRV DA , in place of NRV DA . NRV DA is DA's signed confirmation that B has not validated msg. Once DA has produced NRV DA no validation of msg by B will be accepted. NRV DA is equivalent to invalidation of msg with the supplementary information that B did not cooperate in the decision. At first sight, this places A at a disadvantage, since B can receive msg and simply decide not to cooperate in its validation. However: (i) in any case, B may autonomously decide that a message is not valid (and such invalidation may be subject to extra-protocol dispute resolution); and (ii) A obtains evidence of B 's lack of participation in validation. Thus, in terms of evidence exchanged, the substitution of NRV DA for NRV DA is fair.
From the above, we observe that fairness is guaranteed to both A and B if:
(1) the main protocol completes normally; or (2) B chooses not to engage in the main protocol by not responding to step 3 (up to and including step 3, A has only received NRS DA and B has no useful information about msg); or (3) the exchange is aborted when the main protocol has progressed no further than step 4 (at step 4, B sends NRR B to DA but the protocol can still be aborted because A does not have NRR DA and B is yet to receive msg or NRO DA ); or (4) the exchange is completed successfully after execution of step 4 (at step 4, DA has all the information necessary to complete the exchange; after execution of step 5, DA must guarantee that all expected items are available to both A and B ).
The pivotal point in the main protocol is step 4. Before step 4, DA can only respond to either type of termination request by aborting the exchange. Upon execution of step 4, DA has rn, msg, N RO A and N RR B but is yet to complete the release of information to either A or B. Thus, at this point, they can satisfy whichever type of termination request they receive first. Once DA releases critical information in step 5, they must respond to a termination request by successfully resolving the exchange. A request from an end user, U ∈ {A, B}, to DA to abort an exchange results in execution of the following abort sub-protocol: Apart from the signed request that initiates the resolve sub-protocol, the only significant difference to the abort sub-protocol is that execution of step 2.1 is triggered if either termination state is ABORT ED or the main protocol has not progressed beyond step 3.
Once the termination state of an exchange has been set (whether after execution of the main protocol or one of the above sub-protocols), DA will forever respond in the same way to any subsequent request to abort or resolve the identified exchange (with appropriate abort token or resolution evidence). DA also responds in the same way to any subsequent message of the main protocol. That is, once the termination state has been set, DA suspends the main protocol at lastStep.
Termination may also be triggered by the a priori indication of deadlines for the acknowledgements provided in the main protocol (NRS, NRR and NRV ). In this case, in step 1 of the main protocol A can indicate deadline(s) for delivery that they wish to be observed (on a best effort basis). During protocol execution, DA determines locally whether a delivery deadline is achievable. If not, DA will pro-actively terminate the exchange and issue appropriate abort or resolve tokens to A and B depending on the state of the main protocol at the time of termination.
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Fair exchange with light-weight delivery agent
Normal protocol execution The protocol for fair exchange with light-weight DA is:
This protocol is closer to the Coffey-Saidha protocol with the addition of steps 7 to 9 for NRV of msg. The difference between this protocol and the light-weight end user protocol is that A and B are now responsible for verification of each other's evidence and for its long-term storage. Thus, in steps 5, 6 and 9, DA relays the tokens provided by A and B rather than generating new signed tokens.
Exception handling
The abort and resolve sub-protocols are basically as defined in Sec. 3.4 except that the resolution evidence provided in steps 2.2 and 2.3 is now:
res A = NRS DA , NRR B and res B = rn, msg, NRO A For successful termination before step 7, the DA provides NRV DA (as described in Sec. 3.4). For successful termination after step 6, DA provides NRV B (as opposed to NRV DA ). The abort token is identical to that defined in Sec. 3.4.
Fault tolerance in fair exchange
A fair exchange protocol is fault-tolerant if it ensures no loss of fairness to an honest participant even if the participant's node experiences failures of the assumed type. In other words, an honest user does not suffer a loss of fairness because of their node failure. This is not the case with most of the fair exchange protocols studied in the literature, including the ones presented here. Ezhilchelvan and Shrivastava describe various approaches to preserving fairness in the presence of node crashes and recovery;
11 application of these to the protocols presented here is left as a direction for future work.
Implementation Based on Web Services
In this section, we present the Web services based implementation of a framework for non-repudiation protocol execution (WS-NRExchange). A prime requirement on this middleware is that it is able to support the execution of any deterministic nonrepudiation protocol. It achieves this flexibility through: (i) a well-defined, generic interface for the exchange of protocol messages between protocol participants; (ii) an extensible schema that defines the content of self-describing protocol messages; and (iii) a well-defined API for message processing by the middleware that includes the registration of protocol-specific handlers for messages. Thus, the middleware is designed to adapt to different application requirements, including the execution of different protocols, without disturbing application-level logic. For example, the middleware presented here could be used to execute protocols with inline, online or offline TTP. Section 4.3 describes the generic interface for exchange of protocol messages and the associated message schema. Section 4.4 shows how the middleware adapts to specific protocols by instantiating the protocol-specific handlers to execute a given protocol at runtime.
First, we provide an overview of Web services and the standards used to support WS-NRExchange. To place this discussion in context, Fig. 3 shows how various XML and Web service standards support WS-NRExchange.
Overview of Web services and supporting standards
A Web service can be described, published, located and invoked over the Web. Web services are based on open standards and are designed to inter-operate independent of implementation platform. Web services typically communicate using the SOAP messaging protocol.
12 A SOAP message is an XML document that comprises a message envelope with a header and a body. The header contains message processing information. The body contains the application payload. The interface that a Web service exposes, in terms of messages that can be processed and operations that can be invoked, can be described using the Web Services Description Language (WSDL).
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The WS-Security standard 14 covers the creation of self-protecting messages for Web services. WS-Security applies XML technologies, such as XML Signature and XML Encryption, 16 to SOAP messages. XML Signature specifies how to attach signatures, and related information, to XML documents, or parts of documents, and related material. XML Encryption is the corresponding standard for encryption.
Digital Signature Service (DSS) 17 and XML Key Management Specification (XKMS) 18 are higher level specifications that use WS-Security. DSS specifies a service for the verification and the application of signatures to XML; and for trusted time-stamping of signed information. XKMS concerns public key life-cycle management. It specifies Web service-based PKI functionality such as how to register, locate, verify and revoke the digital credentials that are associated with public keys. XKMS and DSS may be offered as TTP services to support secure Web service interactions, thereby reducing the security infrastructure requirements of users. Organizations may also provide a sub-set of the services in-house as part of their own security infrastructure. For example, an in-house DSS service can be used to apply corporate signatures to XML messages.
Reliable messaging (RM) specifies the message content, protocols and persistence requirements necessary for Web services to implement various forms of reliable message delivery. We require at least once message delivery between well-behaved parties. Currently, there are competing standards proposed for Web service reliable messaging: WS-Reliability and WS-ReliableMessaging. 19, 20 There is overlap between the two proposals and WS-NRExchange can adapt to both.
Our contribution is to provide the NRExchange Web service that uses the standards outlined above. Figure 4 shows the interactions between the main components and services that comprise our implementation. DA, A and B each provide an NRExchange Web service that manages their participation in non-repudiation protocols. Each Web service exposes the same interface for protocol execution. At A and B, this service is deployed as an interceptor to mediate Web service interactions that require nonrepudiation. This interceptor may be co-located with the local application that uses it or may, for example, be part of a corporate firewall service. The end-users, A and B, may themselves be Web services or Web service clients or both. The NRExchange services access additional local services for signing evidence, message persistence and application-level validation. The signing service is required to apply signatures to the parts of messages that have not already been signed b (as dictated by the protocol being executed). This service may be an implementation of DSS or some other mechanism for obtaining private keys to apply signatures as defined by WS-Security. Persistence is required to meet fault tolerance requirements and also for audit. The NRExchange services also access trusted time-stamping services and public key management services (for example, DSS and XKMS services provided by third parties). For protocols that use an inline TTP, trusted time-stamps may optionally be applied by the DA Web service.
WS-NRExchange-based interaction
As described in Sec. 4.3, a WSDL interface has been defined for the interaction between NRExchange services. The SOAP messages exchanged comply with the WS-Security specification.
The NRExchange Web service also provides a local interface to allow registration of application-specific listeners for message validation and other events. A message validation listener may trigger arbitrarily complex validation of a business message. If no validation listener is registered, then the NRExchange service assumes that a message is valid with respect to business contract. Messages that are found to be invalid with respect to contract are logged but are not passed to the target application for processing. Registration of event listeners allows notification of protocol-related events. For example, an application can register to receive notification of zero or more of the acknowledgements generated by the protocols described in Sec. 3. Figure 5 is an extract of the WSDL of an NRExchange Web service that shows the operations that are exposed to other NRExchange services for protocol execution. NRExchange services use the processMessage operation to exchange nonrepudiation protocol messages with each other. The sender provides a protocol message for the receiver to process as specified by the given protocol. Message elements are defined in a related XML Schema. The schema is sufficiently general and extensible for the processMessage operation to be used to execute any protocol that participant services support. The processRequest convenience operation allows send and receipt of protocol messages as request/response pairs.
Generic NRExchange interface and message schema
The abort and resolve operations are for pro-active termination (see Sec. 3.4). These operations are typically used by a DA to inform another participant service that an identified exchange has been aborted or resolved with the given termination state. Invocation of these operations may result in execution of a new sub-protocol using the protocol execution operations.
The getProtocolState operation is a request for information concerning the known state of a protocol run as viewed by the service on which the operation is invoked. This operation may lead to execution of a state request sub-protocol to determine how much of the current state should be revealed to the invokee. The protocol state may be provided during execution of this sub-protocol or by invocation of the setProtocolState operation on the service that originally invoked the getProtocolState operation.
The SOAP binding for the NRExchange service specifies two types of message:
(1) protocol messages that are exchanged during execution of a main protocol or of related sub-protocols using processMessage and, optionally, processRequest; and (2) protocol state (housekeeping) messages that convey information about the state of an identified protocol run or request update about protocol state (exchanged using abort, resolve, getProtocolState and setProtocolState).
Both types of message use a WS-Security header to carry security tokens such as: signatures over evidence; time-stamps; credential and key information; security context and access control information. As shown in Fig. 6 , protocol messages must have a NRExchangeProtocol header. This is an extensible container for non-repudiation protocol data items that are defined in the NRExchange XML schema or may be defined in derivations of that schema or in schemas that are specific to a given non-repudiation protocol. The NRExchange schema specifies that any NRExchangeProtocol header must have protocol name, runId and messageNumber attributes. The protocol name is a URI that serves to uniquely identify the protocol, or sub-protocol, being executed and may also provide access to protocol documentation including schema that specialize the NRExchange schema. The runId is a unique identifier that is normally generated from some base URI and a random digest (a hash of a secure pseudo-random number and other associated input). The inputs to runId generation can be specified using a RunIdGenerator element. The messageNumber is a positive, non-zero value that corresponds to the step of the protocol being executed. Depending on the protocol being executed or the step of the protocol, the following optional items may be included in the NRExchangeProtocol header: the purpose of the protocol message (NRR, NRO etc); the participants in the protocol; the runIds of any related protocol or sub-protocol runs; and information related to acknowledgements and receipts required. The message body contains the application data originally intended to be conveyed from sender to receiver as the body of the business message. Section 5 presents extracts of messages exchanged during execution of the protocol described in Sec. 3.4.
Housekeeping messages do not have an NRExchangeProtocol header. The message body carries protocol state information, or a state update request, that is intended for another NRExchange service. The general form of a protocol state message is shown in Fig. 7 . In addition to identifying the protocol and run to which a message relates, a ProtocolState element may include information such as: the protocol run status; if terminated, the termination state; and the message numbers of any messages seen by the recipient. Protocol messages may be provided as attachments to a protocol state message. A GetProtocolStateMessage is of a similar form to a ProtocolStateMessage except that the ProtocolState element is replaced by a ProtocolStateRequest element that again identifies the protocol name and run to which it relates. In addition, the ProtocolStateRequest element may identify messages seen by the sender and may include a list of the protocol messages that the sender wishes to receive as attachments to any response. Housekeeping messages may result in execution of a sub-protocol to confirm a participant's entitlement to information. Security tokens included in the WS-Security header may also serve to assert entitlement to information.
Protocol message handling
This section describes the processing of an incoming protocol message to illustrate the adaptability of the middleware to different protocols. As shown in Fig. 8 , there are two phases to message processing: generic message handling and protocolspecific message handling. Both phases provide the same handler interface to receive incoming messages for processing. Also, event listeners can be registered in each phase to customize reaction to protocol progress.
In the generic message handling phase, an incoming message is subject to processing that is common to all protocols. First, given access to appropriate keys, any encrypted elements of a message that it is possible to decrypt are decrypted. Then, any signatures contained in the message are verified, along with verification of associated timestamps and certificates. These first two steps are essentially concerned with processing information in the WS-Security header of a message. Assuming this succeeds, the message is validated against the NRExchange message schema. If any of the generic message handling steps fail then normal message processing terminates. This early termination of message processing may indicate an attempt to cheat and, therefore, may trigger dispute resolution (possibly including a request to abort an exchange). One of the uses of event listeners is to customize the reaction to a failure to verify incoming messages. If generic handling completes successfully, the incoming message is passed to a protocol-specific handler.
In the protocol-specific handling phase, the handler first determines the protocol run that the messages relates to and accesses the message log to determine the state of the protocol run. Since protocol messages are self-describing, the state of a protocol run is completely described by the set of messages that have been logged for that run. Given the state of a protocol run, the handler can determine whether the incoming message is in correct sequence. If the message is in correct sequence, the handler can: (i) verify that all expected protocol-specific tokens (message digests, random numbers etc) are present; and (ii) verify the integrity of the tokens and, in particular, perform any necessary comparisons with tokens from any earlier messages. Assuming the message is valid with respect to the executing protocol, the protocol handler generates and sends any new protocol message(s) that are required to continue protocol execution. If the message is not valid with respect to the executing protocol, then, as for generic handling, processing terminates and dispute resolution may be triggered. As shown in Fig. 8 , at the appropriate point in protocol execution, it is the protocol-specific handler that invokes application-level message validation via any registered validation listeners.
The sequence diagram in Fig. 9 shows how a message that has been delivered to a WS-NRExchange service, via its processMessage operation, passes through various components of the middleware. Remote invocation of the processMessage operation leads, in turn, to local one-way invocation of the GenericHandler processMessage method. The GenericHandler performs the processing described above by invocations on MessageDecryptor, SignatureVerifier and NRExchangeSchema components. The NRExchangeSchema can both verify a message with respect to the schema and extract information from a message based on its knowledge of the schema. As shown, having completed message verification, the GenericHandler obtains the name of the protocol to which the message relates. The protocol name is used to instantiate a protocol specific handler from a ProtocolHandlerFactory. The message is then passed to the ProtocolHandler by one-way invocation of the ProtocolHandler processMessage method. The ProtocolHandler is then responsible for continued protocol execution as described above. At appropriate points during message processing, the middleware components shown in Fig. 9 access the infrastructure services shown in Fig. 4 .
Both the GenericHandler and the ProtocolHandler provide an interface corresponding to the abort, resolve, getProtolState and setProtocolState operations defined in Fig. 5 . Again, generic processing of a message is followed by instantiation of an appropriate protocol-specific handler from the protocol name obtained from the incoming message.
Example Application
This section presents a simple tender processing application to demonstrate how the middleware described in Sec. 4 can intercept and regulate a Web services-based business interaction.
c Figure 10 (a) shows the asynchronous exchange of an offer document between a supplier and purchaser as part of the tendering process. The offer represents the terms for tender of goods by the supplier. First, the supplier submits the offer to the purchaser. The purchaser then decides whether to accept or reject the terms of the offer. Some time later, the purchaser returns the offer to the supplier, complete with an indication of their acceptance or rejection. As shown, both parties provide a Web service for submission of an offer (via a processOffer operation). Both parties also have a Web services client for each other's service and a local Web browser-based application interface.
A contract governs the tendering process and includes the following rules that the purchaser wishes to enforce with respect to the supplier's submission of an offer: (i) the supplier can only submit an offer within a pre-defined contract period; (ii) each offer submitted must have a unique identifier and there can be no re-submission of a uniquely identified offer; (iii) the supplier must complete the following offer details: offer identifier, supplier and purchaser identities, contract period, deadline for response and description of goods (including price); and (iv) the supplier must not indicate the acceptance or otherwise of the offer. The supplier wishes to enforce the following contract rules with respect to the purchaser's response: (i) the offer is only valid if the purchaser responds before the deadline for response; (ii) only the first response to an offer is valid; (iii) the purchaser must not alter any terms of the offer that were set by the supplier; and (iv) the purchaser must complete the offer by indicating its acceptance or rejection.
In the demonstrator, the NRExchange middleware intercepts the interaction in Fig. 10(a) to both enforce the above rules and to render the interaction nonrepudiable. First, the supplier's submission is exchanged for non-repudiation evidence, including NRV with respect to contract, using the protocol described in Sec. 3.4 . If the submission is valid, there is a second execution of the protocol to exchange the purchaser's response for corresponding non-repudiation evidence, including NRV. Figure 10 (b) depicts the first exchange, governing submission of the offer by the supplier. As shown, both supplier and purchaser provide an NRExchange Web service. A delivery agent TTP NRExchange service supports the fair exchange as described in Sec. 3. All messages are routed through the NRExchange services. The end-user NRExchange services ensure that their local applications only ever receive either a valid offer for processing or a notification of the invalidity of the offer. In each phase of the interaction, an offer is considered invalid if: (i) there is any violation with respect to contract; or (ii) cheating is detected during protocol execution (for example, the use of credentials that have expired); or (iii) the protocol is aborted. The contract rules are encoded in validation listeners at the supplier and purchaser. These listeners are invoked by the middleware at the appropriate point in protocol execution.
In the following example, the supplier (ChemicalsRUs) submits a valid offer for the supply of methane. In response, the purchaser (ChemProc Ltd) attempts to cheat by issuing acceptance of the offer but at a lower price. The example shows user interaction with local applications and extracts from messages in the DA (TTP) non-repudiation log. The example application and NRExchange services were implemented using AXIS Web services deployed in the Tomcat container. 21, 22 However, aside from some AXIS-specific interceptor code, the middleware implementation is AXIS-independent and could be re-deployed on a range of different Web services platforms.
In Fig. 11 , ChemicalsRUs edit a newly created offer. Note, the offer price for a kilogram of methane is set to 100.00 Euro. Figure 12 is an extract of the first protocol message sent from ChemicalsRUs NRExchange service to TTP NRExchange service. As shown, the NRExchangeProtocol header identifies the protocol name, runId, message number and purpose of the message (NRO). The header also includes a specification of how the runId is generated. This enables the TTP to verify its integrity and to extract the random number that is used later in the protocol. The header also specifies protocol participants, receipts required -#nrex header for the protocol header and #Body for the message body -and acknowledgements required. The body of the message is the offer document that contains the data from Fig. 11 . A WS-Security header (not shown) precedes the protocol header and includes, for example, signatures over the referenced #nrex header and #Body elements. We refer the reader to our related technical report 23 for further details of message content.
In Fig. 13 , ChemProc Ltd respond to the offer by lowering the price to 90.00 Euro (an illegal action) and selecting "accept offer" (a legal action). The change in price leads to invalidation of the offer with respect to the contract conditions enforced by the ChemicalsRUs NRExchange service. Figure 14(a) shows notification of the alleged contract violation to the ChemProc Ltd application, with a reference to the runId for retrieval of related messages in the non-repudiation log. The violation is "alleged" because ChemProc Ltd may wish to contest the allegation of misbehavior. Figure 14(b) shows that, at the ChemicalsRUs application, the identified offer is now considered in dispute. Figure 15 is an extract of protocol message 7.0 sent by ChemicalsRUs NRExchange service to TTP NRExchange service that represents non-repudiable invalidation of the revised offer due to changes to the supplier's terms. The body of message 1.0 of this protocol run would show the invalid, revised offer from ChemProc Ltd.
At the end of the above example, ChemicalsRUs, ChemProc Ltd and TTP each have non-repudiable evidence of the submission of a valid offer by ChemicalsRUs. Similarly, they have non-repudiable evidence of the invalid response, and contract violation, by ChemProc Ltd. The example offer application is "NRExchange-aware" in the sense that notification of contract violations are propagated to the application. However, the middleware is sufficiently flexible to allow the application programmer to remain unaware of the NRExchange middleware. In which case, contract violations would be manifest as application-level exceptions requiring further investigation.
It should be noted that the offer identifier correlates the two phases of the asynchronous application-level interaction. The identifier is signed during protocol execution and, therefore, the correlation of the phases is non-repudiable. However, it cannot be assumed, in general, that applications will provide such correlation whenever it is necessary. As discussed in Sec. 7, we therefore intend to provide nonrepudiable correlation at the protocol level to support different message exchange patterns. The RelatedRun element of the NRExchange schema (see Fig. 6 ) is a basic building block for this support.
Related Work
In our earlier work, 24 we described how component middleware (such as a J2EE application server) can be enhanced to support non-repudiation. The work presented in this paper is a significant extension to provide fair, validated, nonrepudiable message delivery in the sort of asynchronous and long-running interactions that Web services are intended to support. partners agree protocol bindings for the exchange of business messages. Currently, the TPIE supports ebXML 33 and RosettaNet PIPs standards. The TPIE's B2BDefaultWebApp component enforces a business protocol binding at run-time and can be configured to apply signatures to the business protocol messages. The TPIE includes a non-repudiation service to apply and verify signatures, and to access audit and time-stamping services. The non-repudiation is voluntary. There is no support for fair exchange. Also, non-repudiation is only available for the supported business protocol bindings. It is not possible to apply non-repudiation to other interactions. Nor is it possible to systematically validate business interactions with respect to contracts other than the supported bindings. With respect to application-level validation of business messages, the work of Minsky et al. 34 on Law Governed Interaction (LGI) represents one of the earliest attempts to provide coordination between autonomous organizations. Trusted agents act as mediators that comply with a global policy.
LGI does not address systematic non-repudiation, but does support automatic validation techniques. This is similar to work by colleagues 35 that aims to automate, as far as possible, the derivation and verification of validation processes from business contracts. This is complementary to our work on non-repudiation. Our system provides the necessary hooks to invoke a validation process at run-time and to bind the generated validation decisions to non-repudiation evidence.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have developed an approach and a reference implementation for the support of fair non-repudiable interactions. We showed how an existing delivery agent-based protocol could be augmented to render a common business message exchange non-repudiable. This involved the addition of extra steps for message validation. We then described how the protocol could be modified to facilitate a more light-weight delivery agent. In Sec. 4, we described our Web services-based implementation. This involved a general overview of the architecture showing how our services interact with existing Web service standards and services. We then described our Web services interface to protocol execution, the protocol message schema and the message handling process. Finally, we demonstrated the use of the middleware in a simple business interaction. From the survey of related work in Sec. 6, we are not aware of another middleware system that is capable of rendering arbitrary Web service interactions both non-repudiable and fair. Further, we know of no other system that provides the flexibility to "plug-in" both the applicationlevel validation of B2B interactions and the mechanism that enforces that validation at run-time.
Future work will provide end-to-end fair non-repudiation of application-level request/response message exchange. Essentially, the message delivery primitive will be used to provide fair exchange of both the request and the response message along with the non-repudiation of the correlation between the application-level messages.
This will be similar to the non-repudiable service invocation described in Ref. 24 but will apply in the Web services context and will operate for different request/response semantics (for example: asynchronous, deferred synchronous and synchronous). We also intend to use the NRExchange infrastructure to provide Web services-based non-repudiable information sharing.
36
Our implementation operates a layer above reliable messaging. However, there is duplication of effort between fair exchange and reliable messaging both in terms of acknowledgements generated and message persistence. We intend to investigate tighter integration of the two services. Our approach will be modular and configurable. Essentially, either the fair exchange service will provide reliable messaging directly (for greater performance) or, as now, it will rely on an existing standardsbased implementation to provide a reliable channel.
The correct implementation of non-repudiation protocols is a challenging task. To gain high confidence in a given implementation, ideally we require both: (i) a formal, verified protocol specification; and (ii) tool support to generate an implementation from the specification. The former area has attracted considerable attention. Given the flexible framework described in Sec. 7, we intend to provide tool support to generate protocol implementations for execution in the framework. We will investigate the automation of as much of the implementation process as possible and also provide guidance on those aspects that cannot be automated.
